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RECENT DECISIONS 
ANTITRUST-CLAYTON Acr-ADMISSIBILITY OF CRIMINAL CoNVIc-
TION ENTERED ON A PLEA OF GUILTY AS PRIMA FACIE EVIDENCE IN CIVIL 
SuIT FOR TREBLE DAMAGES-In a civil action for treble damages under sec-
tion 4 of the Clayton Act,1 the plaintiff sought to allege as prima facie 
evidence of a Sherman Act violation a criminal conviction entered on a plea 
of guilty by the defendant in an earlier prosecution by the government. 
The trial court sustained a motion by the defendant to strike from plain-
tiff's complaint any reference to the criminal prosecution.2 On appeal, 
held, reversed, one judge dissenting. A judgment entered on a plea of 
guilty is not a consent judgment3 within the meaning of the proviso to 
section 5(a) of the Clayton Act,4 and is therefore admissible as prima facie 
evidence of defendant's violation of antitrust law in a subsequent civil ac-
tion for treble damages. Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. 
Co., 32 U.S.L. WEEK 2133 (7th Cir. Sept. 12, 1963). 
Implicit in section 5(a) of the Clayton Act are two theories of antitrust 
law enforcement. On the one hand, the section encourages treble damage 
actions by injured private parties as an additional deterrent to violation of 
the antitrust laws. By permitting the plaintiff in a treble damage action to 
use a prior government judgment as prima facie evidence of the violation 
sought to be proved, section 5(a) considerably lessens the plaintiff's burden 
1 Section 4 authorizes civil actions for treble damages against defendants whose viola-
tions of antitrust law have injured the plaintiffs in their business or property. 38 Stat. 
731 (1914), 15 u.s.c. § 15 (1958). 
2 Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 211 F. Supp. 712 (N.D. Ill. 
1962). The criminal violation in the instant case was price fixing, prohibited as a com-
bination in restraint of trade by the Sherman Act. See 26 Stat. 209 (1890), 15 U.S.C. § I 
(1958). 
3 A consent judgment or decree is an agreement between the parties, approved by the 
court, determining the rights of the parties upon the facts of the case. See Donovan 8e 
McAllister, Consent Decrees in the Enforcement of Federal Anti-trust Laws, 46 HARV. L. 
REv. 885, 912 (1933). It cannot be forced upon the defendant without his consent. United 
States v. Hartford-Empire Co., 1 F.R.D. 424, 427 (N.D. Ohio 1940). However, a consent 
judgment may be approved by a court without the consent of the government, where the 
government seeks to include in the judgment a waiver of the rule that consent judgments 
are not prima fade evidence in private suits for treble damages. See United States v. 
Brunswick-Balke-Collender Co., 203 F. Supp. 657 (E.D. Wis. 1962); United States v. Ward 
Baking Co., 5 TRADE REG. REP. (1963 Trade Cas.) 1J 70609 (M.D. Fla. Dec. 10, 1962); 
Dabney, Consent Decrees Without Consent, 63 CoLuM. L. REv. 1053 (1963). 
4 69 Stat. 283 (1955), 15 U.S.C. § 16(a) (1958), amending 38 Stat. 731 (1914) reads in 
full: "A final judgment or decree heretofore or hereafter rendered in any civil or criminal 
proceeding brought by or on behalf of the United States under the antitrust laws to the 
effect that a defendant has violated said laws shall be prima fade evidence against such 
defendant in any action or proceeding brought by any other party against such defendant 
under said laws or by the United States under section 4A [of the Clayton Act] as to all 
matters respecting which said judgment or decree would be an estoppel as between the 
parties thereto: Provided, That this section shall not apply to consent judgments or 
decrees entered before any testimony has been taken or to judgments or decrees entered 
in actions under 4A." Prior to the passage of the Clayton Act in 1914, a criminal conviction 
was inadmissible in a subsequent civil action. Buckeye Powder Co. v. E. I. DuPont de 
Nemours Powder Co., 248 U.S. 55, 63 (1918). 
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of proof and therefore increases the likelihood of recovery. On the other 
hand, the proviso encourages settlements in negotiated consent decrees by 
exempting these decrees from use as prima fade evidence in subsequent 
treble damage actions. In criminal proceedings, a plea of nolo contendere5 
has been held to result in a consent judgment within the meaning of the 
proviso.6 Presently, there is disagreement among the federal district courts 
as to whether a conviction entered on a plea of guilty should also be con-
sidered a consent judgment.7 Resolution of the issue necessarily involves a 
decision as to which theory is more appropriate in the context of criminal 
proceedings-the encouragement of consent judgments or the deterrent to 
initial violation posed by use of a criminal conviction as prima facie evi-
dence in a subsequent treble damage action. 
Conceptually viewing the civil consent judgment, the nolo contendere 
plea, and the guilty plea, the significant dissimilarity of the guilty plea 
would seem to justify its exclusion from the protection of the proviso.8 A 
guilty plea is not the result of negotiation between the defendant and the 
government, as are the civil consent judgment and often the plea of nolo 
contendere.9 Nor does the guilty plea require the approval of the court 
or the prosecutor, as do the nolo plea and the civil consent judgment. 
The guilty plea is entered as a matter of right,10 whereas the court accepts 
IS A plea of nolo contendere is a statement by the defendant that he does not wish to 
contest the issue of his guilt or innocence. Therefore the resulting judgment cannot bind 
the defendant beyond the particular case. Hudson v. United States, 272 U.S. 451, 455 
(1926); accord, United States v. Norris, 281 U.S. 619, 622 (1930); United States v. Safeway 
Stores, 20 F.R.D. 451, 454 (N.D. Tex. 1957); Twin Ports Oil Co. v. Pure Oil Co., 26 F. 
Supp. 366, 378 (D. Minn. 1939); Lenvin &: Meyers, Nolo Contendere: Its Nature and 
Implications, 51 YALE L.J. 1255, 1263 (1942). 
6 Twin Ports Oil Co. v. Pure Oil Co., supra note 5, at 372; accord, Atlantic City Elec. 
Co. v. General Elec. Co., 207 F. Supp. 620, 628 (S.D.N.Y. 1962); Alden-Rochelle Inc. v. 
American Sec'y of C.A. &: Publishers, 3 F.R.D. 157, 159 (S.D.N.Y. 1942); Barnsdall Ref. 
Corp. v. Birnamwood Oil Co., 32 F. Supp. 308, 312 (E.D. Wis. 1940), 28 CALIF. L. REv. 
777 (1940). 
7 The district court's decision in the principal case was the first to hold that a con• 
viction on a plea of guilty is a consent judgment. Earlier cases ~ecognizing that prop-
osition are: Department of Water &: Power v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 32 F.R.D. 204 
(S.D. Cal. 1963); Twin Ports Oil Co. v. Pure Oil Co., supra note 6, at 371-72 (dictum). 
Supporting the result in the principal case are Simco Sales Serv., Inc. v. Air Reduction 
Co., 213 F. Supp. 505 (E.D. Pa. 1963); Atlantic City Elec. Co. v. Gene1·al Elec. Co., supra 
note 6, at 627. For different opinions whether a conviction on a plea of guilty should be 
considered a consent judgment, see Dix, Decrees and Judgments Under Section 5 of the 
Clayton Antitrust Law, 30 GEo. L.J. 331, 342-43 (1942); 65 HARV. L. REv. 1400, 1401 
(1952); 46 ILL. L. REv. 765, 766 n.10 (1951); 71 YALE L.J. 684, 686 (1962). 
a Atlantic City Elec. Co. v. General Elec. Co., 207 F. Supp. 620 (S.D.N.Y. 1962) (con-
victions entered on pleas of nolo contendere, but not on pleas of guilty, are consent judg-
ments); accord, Dix, supra note 7, at 342, where the author states: "In a criminal 
prosecution, a plea of guilty is not a consent judgment." See Peterson, Consent Decrees: 
A JVeapon of Anti-trust Enforcement, 18 U. KAN. CITY L. REv. 34, 35 (1950); Comment, 
55 MICH. L. REV. 92 n.l (1956). 
o A plea of nolo contendere is sometimes negotiated when both parties prefer to avoid 
a long trial. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 23 F. Supp. 531, 532 (W .D. Wis. 
1938); see Lenvin &: Meyers, supra note 5, at 1268 (some judges object to the plea as the 
result of compromise). 
10 Annot., 152 A.L.R. 253, 267 (1944). 
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civil consent judgments and nolo pleas at its discretion,11 after taking into 
consideration the opinions of the prosecutor.12 Moreover, the conviction 
resulting from a guilty plea is considered an adjudication of the defend-
ant's guilt which binds the defendant beyond the particular case. A plea 
of guilty estops the defendant to deny his guilt in a subsequent suit.13 The 
civil consent judgment and the nolo plea, on the other hand, do not ad-
judicate the issues of defendant's liability or guilt,14 and a nolo plea creates 
no estoppel against the defendant to deny his guilt in a subsequent suit.16 
Unlike the plea of guilty, the plea of nolo contendere could not be used as 
prima fade evidence in a subsequent suit even if it were said not to result 
in a consent judgment,16 because, unlike the plea of guilty, the plea of nolo 
contendere does not qualify as prima fade evidence according to section 
5(a) of the Clayton Act.17 Since the plea of guilty does not closely resemble 
the nolo plea and the civil consent judgment, either by nature or by nor-
mal effect beyond the case, it would be difficult to conclude upon conceptual 
grounds that a guilty plea should be construed, like the nolo plea, as result-
ing in a consent judgment within the meaning of the proviso to section 5(a). 
The language of section 5(a) and its legislative history provide insuffi-
cient guidance in determining whether a conviction entered on a plea of 
guilty should be treated as a consent judgment. An argument has been made, 
based on the language of the Clayton Act itself, that a conviction entered 
on a plea of guilty must be considered a consent judgment. The thrust of 
the argument is that consent judgments in both civil and criminal actions 
are recognized by the language of the statute, the necessary premise being 
that if such a thing as a criminal consent judgment exists, the guilty plea 
is within that category. For example, the proviso to section 5(a) refers to 
11 "A defendant may plead not guilty, guilty, or with the consent of the court, nolo 
contendere." FED. R. CRIM, P. 11; Annot., 152 A.L.R. 253, 267 (1944); Lenvin &: Meyers, 
supra note 5, at 1256. 
12 The consent of the prosecutor is unnecessary to the acceptance of the plea of 
nolo contendere. Annot., 152 A.L.R. 253, 294 (1944). However, the court will take the 
prosecutor's opinion into account in deciding whether to accept the plea. United States v. 
Safeway Stores, Inc., 20 F.R.D. 451, 452 (N.D. Tex. 1957); United States v. Standard Ultra• 
marine &: Color Co., 137 F. Supp. 167, 172 (S.D.N.Y. 1955). But cf. United States v. Jones, 
119 F. Supp. 288 (S.D. Cal. 1954) (court accepted the plea over the government's objec• 
tion). 
13 Hudson v. United States, 272 U.S. 451, 455 (1926); State v. Burnett, 174 N.C. 796, 
797, 93 S.E. 473,474 (1917). 
14 In consent judgments, the parties have settled rather than litigated the matters 
originally put at issue. James, Consent Judgments as Collateral Estoppel, 108 U. PA. L. 
REv. 173, 179 (1959); see R.EsTATEMENT, JUDGMENTS § 68, comment i (1942); Dix, supra 
note 7, at 343 (judgment based on a plea of nolo contendere is not an adjudication that 
defendant has violated antitrust law as charged). 
15 See note 5 supra. 
16 E.g., State v. LaRose, 71 N.H. 435, 440, 52 Atl. 943, 946 (1902); Annot., 18 A.L.R.2d 
1287, 1290, 1314 (1951). 
17 A conviction on a plea of nolo contendere can not be used as prima facie evidence 
because the judgment would not be an estoppel as between the parties. See notes 4 &: 5 
supra. 
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"consent judgments or decrees," and earlier in the section the phrase "judg-
ments or decrees" includes those rendered in criminal proceedings.18 Also, 
a temporary proviso to section 5(a) specifically mentioned "consent judg-
ments or decrees rendered in criminal proceedings . . . ."19 Yet nowhere in 
the language of the act is a conviction on a plea of guilty explicitly defined 
as a consent judgment. 
Beyond arguments centering on the language of the statute, it has been 
asserted that Congress intended to include convictions entered on pleas of 
guilty within the meaning of consent judgment under the proviso.20 In 
support of this argument are statements of congressmen, in debate, express-
ing their opinions that the proviso applies to all uncontested actions,21 and 
more specifically to convictions entered on pleas of guilty.22 However, the 
consent judgment construction of a plea of guilty was also expressly rejected 
in debate,23 and several congressmen vigorously objected to the proviso if 
this interpretation were to be placed upon it.24 Recent cases agree that 
there is room for difference of opinion as to congressional intent,25 even 
though there is disagreement as to the ultimate question of whether consent 
judgments should include convictions on pleas of guilty. In light of the 
inconclusiveness of the legislative history and the conceptual difficulties in 
attempting to classify the guilty plea as a consent judgment, a resolution of 
the issue must be based on considerations of policy. 
The major policy objectives of section 5(a) of the Clayton Act were to 
ease the burdens of litigation for an injured private party,26 and, by in-
18 Twin Ports Oil Co. v. Pure Oil Co., 26 F. Supp. 366, 368 (D. Minn. 1939); Barnsdall 
Ref. Corp. v. Birnamwood Oil Co., 32 F. Supp. 308, 312 (E.D. Wis. 1940). 
19 38 Stat. 731 (1914). The temporary proviso read in full: 
"Provided further, This section shall not apply to consent judgments or decrees 
rendered in criminal proceedings or suits in equity, now pending, in which the taking of 
testimony has been commenced but has not been concluded, provided such judgments or 
decrees are rendered before any further testimony is taken." 
See Atlantic City Elec. Co. v. General Elec. Co., 207 F. Supp. 620, 624-25 (S.D.N.Y. 
1962). This case suggests that since the temporary proviso's reference to consent judg-
ments rendered in criminal proceedings was excluded from the remaining proviso, the 
term "consent judgment" in the remaining proviso does not necessarily include any 
criminal judgments at all. Even Judge Nordbye, in his leading opinion in Twin Ports 
Oil Co. v. Pure Oil Co., 26 F. Supp. 366, 371 (D. Minn. 1939), admits that "strictly speak-
ing, it may be that there is no such thing as a consent judgment in criminal proceedings," 
and that "it is not an accurate characterization of the effect of a plea of guilty .•.. " 
See 65 HARV. L. REv. 1400, 1401 (1952). 
20 For discussions of congressional history, see Twin Ports Oil Co. v. Pure Oil Co., 
supra note 19; Dix, supra note 7, at 332-35; 71 YALE L.J. 684, 686-87 (1962). 
21 E.g., 51 CoNG. REc. 16047 (1914) (remarks of Senator Borah); id. at 16276 (remarks 
of Mr. Webb). 
22 E.g., id. at 15939 (remarks of Senator Nelson); id. at 16046 (remarks of Senator 
Norris). 
23 Id. at 15823-24 (remarks of Senator Walsh). 
24 E.g., id. at 15822-26 (remarks of Senator Reed); id. at 16046-47 (remarks of Senator 
Norris). 
25 Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Allis Chalmers Mfg. Co., 211 F. Supp. 712, 728 (N.D. 
Ill. 1962); Atlantic City Elec. Co. v. General Elec. Co., 207 F. Supp. 620, 625 (S.D.N.Y. 1962). 
26 E.g., 51 CONG, REc. 13851 (1914) (remarks of Senator Walsh); id. at 16046 (remarks 
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creasing the latter's chances of recovering treble damages, to deter future 
violations of the antitrust laws.27 On the other hand, it was recognized that 
consent judgments are an effective tool of antitrust enforcement because of 
their great potential for flexibility and economy.28 Congress added the 
proviso exempting consent judgments from the prima facie evidence rule 
so that defendants wishing to avoid treble damage recoveries would be 
encouraged to accept consent judgments rather than litigation, which could 
lead to a judgment admissible under the prima facie evidence rule. In 
the context of civil proceedings, the preference for consent judgments 
has been conducive to prompt and effective enforcement of the laws. The 
government's saving of time and expense by avoiding plenary litigation in 
the consent cases allows more extensive investigation and prosecution of 
other violations of the antitrust law. 
In criminal prosecutions, however, there are several considerations which 
suggest that the section 5(a) deterrent should not be precluded by the de-
fendant's option to submit a plea of guilty. Economic injury to private 
parties is much more likely tp result where predatory activities are deemed 
so serious as to warrant criminal prosecution, and thus there is a greater 
need for the section 5(a) deterrent.29 Yet injured private parties may find 
the burdens of proving criminal violations of antitrust law prohibitive un-
less they can use defendants' pleas of guilty as prima facie evidence of 
guilt.30 Because of the heavy burden of proving criminal violation, the 
legislative intention to facilitate private recovery by passage of section 5(a) 
would be unreasonably obstructed by allowing the protection of consent 
judgments in those cases where private parties are most likely to have 
sustained injury. 
Encouragement of pretrial settlement does not justify the dilution of 
the deterrent effect intended for section 5(a) by the interpretation of guilty 
pleas as consent judgments. The government is no longer interested in ob-
of Senator Norris). See Emich Motors Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 340 U.S. 558, 568 
(1951); United States v. Standard Ultramarine 8e Color Co., 137 F. Supp. 167, 171-72 
(S.D.N.Y. 1955); Twin Ports Oil Co. v. Pure Oil Co., 26 F. Supp. 366, 369 (D. Minn. 1939). 
27 United States v. Standard Ultrama1ine 8e Color Co., supra note 26, at 171; ATI'Y GEN. 
NAT'L COMM. ANTITRUsr REP. 378 (1955); see Vold, Are Threefold Damages Under the 
Anti-trust Act Penal or Compensatory?, 28 KY. L.J. 117 (1940). 
28 The economy of consent judgments is an important consideration to the govern-
ment, "Caught in the vise of increasing complaints and decreasing enforcement resources." 
ATI'Y GEN. NAT'L CoMM. ANTITRusr REP. 360 (1955). The district court in the principal case 
finds the saving of expense to the government to be the controlling consideration in its 
decision. Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Allis Chalmers Mfg. Co., 211 F. Supp. 712, 728 
(N.D. Ill. 1962); see 65 HARV. L. REv. 1400, 1401 (1952). 
29 See ATI'Y GEN. NAT'L COMM. ANTITRusr REP. 350 (1955), listing the types of offenses 
prosecuted criminally. 
30 The government's expenses of proving a violation of antitrust law are not nearly 
so great as those of injured private parties, because information already obtained from a 
grand jury assures the government a reasonable chance of conviction. Private parties can 
obtain the same information the government already has only by resorting to expensive 
di~covery procedures before trial. 
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taining a consent judgment when it chooses to bring criminal proceedings 
against a violator of antitrust law. In situations where an offense might be 
prosecuted as a civil or criminal action, the government's decision to bring 
criminal proceedings is, in effect, a decision that the severe punishments of 
imprisonment, fines, and more easily attainable private treble damages re-
coveries are the most appropriate methods of antitrust enforcement in the 
particular case. Illustratively, the government often chooses to contest a 
nolo contendere plea because the resulting conviction would be a consent 
judgment, and hence unavailable as prima fade evidence in subsequent 
private suits.31 A defendant should not be able to obtain the protection of 
a plea of nolo as of right by pleading guilty instead. Proper exercise of dis-
cretion by the courts and the government in allowing use of the nolo plea 
will prevent unduly harsh results in criminal antitrust actions.32 Such an 
approach would seem preferable to the permissive 1-1se of the guilty plea by 
defendants as a partial insulation from subsequent private suits. 
Arthur M. Sherwood 
81 United States v. Jones, 119 F. Supp. 288, 289 n.l (S.D. Cal. 1954). 
32 A treble damage recovery may result in excessive punishment of a defendant whose 
violation of the antitrust laws has been relatively minor. Comment, 61 YALE L.J. 1010, 
1061-62 (1952). Yet "without the treble damage sanction, the meagre nature of the 
criminal penalties arising from government actions would render the anti-trust laws 
nugatory." 18 U. CHI. L. REv. 130, 138 (1950). 
